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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Previous Studies: A Benchmark
In recent years, geographical issues have been considered in international trade
models. Krugman (1991a) (1991b) and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999,
Ch.5) provide us with the basic structure of the Monopolistic Competition frame-
work: the Core-Periphery (C-P) model, where (internal) increasing returns to
scale (IRS) drives concentration in one region and higher transportation costs
lead to diversiﬁcation between two regions.1 In the model, manufacturing work-
ers migrate gradually in response to real wages, while farmers are immobile. As
a result, as transportation costs fall, manufacturing concentrates in one region,
while agriculture remains in both regions. The authors term this “Core-periphery
Structure” and warn that it may cause inequality of welfare between the regions.
The C-P model is simple and intuitive, but its assumptions are crucial: farmers
are bound to their land, while manufacturing workers move to the region that
oﬀers higher real wages, and transportation costs are only imposed on manufac-
tured goods.2 The model disregards technological diﬀerences between regions and
1These models have been extended by many other subsequent studies. Krugman and Ven-
ables (1995) proposed the Vertical Linkage Model, which showed that the presence of inter-
mediate goods creates agglomeration even under a single immobile production factor. Martin
and Rogers (1995) proposed the Footloose Capital Model. Puga and Venables (1996) and Puga
(1999) have considered forward and backward linkages in a multi-industry framework.
2Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, Ch.7) were aware of the narrow assumptions, citing
the plausible example that higher trade costs are often imposed on perishable agricultural goods
rather than manufactured goods. They considered agricultural transportation costs and found
that diversiﬁcation occurs not only with higher transportation costs but also with lower costs.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 2
external IRS or knowledge spillovers, which are the most important character-
istics in agglomeration in the classical economic geography literature (Marshall,
1920; Hoover, 1948; Mills, 1967).
1.2 Relation to Current Literature
Many recent studies have attempted to overcome the limitations of the C-P
model, and some are relevant to this paper. Forslid and Wooton (2003) in-
troduced comparative advantage into the C-P Model in the framework of Dixit-
Stiglitz type monopolistic competition. Each region has a comparative advantage
for some industries, assuming diﬀerent ﬁxed costs across regions. The authors
thus provided a counterexample to Krugman’s model, in which higher trans-
portation costs lead to agglomeration while lower costs lead to diversiﬁcation.
Ricci (1999) also considered comparative advantage in the framework of two IRS
sectors together with one constant returns to scale (CRS) sector: each country
has a comparative advantage in the production of one of the two IRS sectors in
marginal cost. He found that lower trade costs may reduce agglomeration forces.
Aside from the C-P model, a few studies examine comparative advantage
and geographical concentration using the Ricardian Model. Matsuyama and
Takahashi (1998) found self-defeating and ineﬃcient concentration, and Taka-
hashi (2003) suggested that a reduction in trade costs increases the possibility of
choosing an ineﬃcient location of production.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 3
However, we should note that these theoretical studies above on agglomeration
and comparative advantage are very rare, in contrast to a great deal of empiri-
cal evidence showing the relevance of agglomeration and comparative advantage
(Davis and Weinstein, 2003; Midelfart-Knarvik, et al., 2000; 2001; Midelfart-
Knarvik and Overman, 2002).
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, in order to address the issue
raised above, we consider comparative advantage in a much simpler and more
general manner than Forslid and Wooton (2003) and Ricci (1999), using the
Continuum-of-Goods Trade Model by Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977)
(the DFS model). Although we work with diﬀerent mechanisms, our results are
consistent with theirs. Like their models,o u rm o d e la s s u m e sat e c h n o l o g i c a ld i f -
ference between regions. This comparative advantage may stem from diﬀerent
stages of economic development. The advantage of the DFS model is that it
depends less on the restrictive assumptions of the Krugman-type models by as-
suming that all people can migrate and that transportation costs are imposed on
all tradable goods. Furthermore, this framework provides an easier way to deal
with multiple industries and to discuss policy on the basis of welfare.
Second, external IRS is considered, because most models in economic ge-
ography are based on internal IRS subject to agglomeration forces while many
empirical studies pay considerable attention to external IRS.3 External IRS has
3For instance, Ellison and Glaeser (1999) estimated the eﬀe c to fl o c a t i o no fi n d u s t r i e so n
population density and the percentage of the labor force with high skills. See also Henderson
(1999).Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 4
long been recognized as a very important factor in geographical concentration.
Marshall (1920) pointed out knowledge spillovers as one of the three outstanding
features known as Marshallian Externality. Through this eﬀect, the dissemination
of innovative ideas tends to be limited to the region, as can be seen in many em-
pirical examples where intra-regional knowledge spillovers are much greater than
international ones (Branstetter, 2001; Eaton and Kortum, 1999). Further, Bald-
win et al. (2001) suggested that local spillovers crucially contribute to geograph-
ical concentration and economic growth. Besides knowledge spillovers, another
feature is associated with face-to-face communication. When all the workers are
concentrated in one region, a great deal of communication and interaction arises
in the region, which drives innovation and the development of eﬃcient produc-
tion technologies (local communication eﬀect). Yet another aspect is identiﬁed
in the endogenous growth literature: population growth in a speciﬁc region leads
to innovation. Goodfriend and McDeremott (1999) showed that industrializa-
tion can be driven by increased population and market size. Kremar (1993) also
demonstrated this phenomenon empirically over the long term.
The third purpose of this paper is to examine welfare analysis and regional
policy implications. In the C-P model, it was diﬃcult to measure regional wel-
fare. Farmers and manufacturing workers face diﬀerent real wages, even in the
same region. However, some recent studies emphasize the importance of welfare
analysis and rationality of government intervention (Baldwin et al. 2003; Otta-
viano et al. 2002). Along with this current stream of research, it is possible toGeographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 5
analyze regional policy more easily by assuming that all people can migrate in
response to the same utility in each region. Furthermore, welfare analysis is in-
dispensable to the model presented here: the C-P model cannot account for loss
of resources because it assumes manufacturing workers are footloose and that
farmers are bound to the land. Our model, however, allows for loss of welfare (a)
because the economy can devastate the land and location-speciﬁc technology by
all people migrating to the other region, (b) because of the presence of transport
costs nontraded goods at diﬀerent prices emerge across the regions, and (c) be-
cause migration shifts the range of traded goods and results in a changeable total
payment of transport costs for imports even under ﬁxed transport cost rates.
In this paper, “concentration” is deﬁn e da sas i t u a t i o nw h e r ea l lp e o p l ec o n -
centrate in one region and the other region is devastated. “(Symmetric) diver-
siﬁcation” is a situation where a population is equally distributed between two
regions, which is assumed to be the initial equilibrium. Finally, “asymmetric di-
versiﬁcation” represents a population distributed unequally between two regions.
By considering these aspects, several interesting results arise. First, concen-
tration occurs with higher transportation costs, while diversiﬁcation results from
lower transportation costs. This outcome is contrary to the C-P model. Then,
at intermediate levels of transportation costs, multiple equilibria emerge, and
the stable equilibrium is associated with asymmetric diversiﬁcation. External
IRS through migration leads to one-sided expansion of the varieties of exports
in the more populated region due to transport costs. This increases the pay-Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 6
ment of transport costs, and thus results in the worst welfare of all the equilibria.
In this case, policies to sustain the initial symmetric diversiﬁcation equilibrium
are necessary: to subsidize nontraded goods industries and comparatively less
advantageous industries in each region.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
basic model and examines the equilibria and their stability. In Section 3, welfare
is examined in each equilibrium. The fourth section discusses policies based on
the welfare analysis, and Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2B a s i c M o d e l
2.1 Supply, Demand, and Equilibrium
There are two regions. The total population in the world is normalized to unity:
L(Region 1) + L∗(Region 2) = 1, and in the initial equilibrium the two regions
have the same populations: L = L∗ = 0.5. We assume that people can move
from one region to the other and that they can only use the location-speciﬁc
technology of the destination region. Each region has a location-speciﬁcu n i tl a bo r
requirement, denoted as a(z,L) in Region 1 and a∗(z,L∗) in Region2, where z ∈











00,L) for any z
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>z
0 ∈ [0,1] under ﬁxed L and L∗. For simplicity,
the regions’ technologies are contrasting, i.e., they are symmetric around z=0.5
with a(z,L) increasing in terms of z in the same way as a∗(z,L∗) is decreasingGeographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 7
(taking L = L∗). Thus deﬁning A(z,L)=
a∗(z,L∗)
a(z,L) as in the DFS model, we




As far as external IRS is concerned, we assume that the unit labor requirement





∂L∗ < 0 (2)
These imply that an industry is more eﬃc i e n ti ft h e r ea r em o r ew o r k e r si nt h e
region. If the external economies are very large, concentration occurs at all
transportation costs. To keep things interesting, a “no black hole” assumption is




< 0, − 1 <
∂a∗(z,L∗)
∂L∗ < 0 (3)
As in DFS, there is perfect competition, so price equals marginal cost:
P = a(z,L)w (4)
Trade between regions is costly. Transportation costs are of the iceberg type
(Samuelson, 1954), where a unit of the good transported from the other region
melts away and g units of the good shipped actually arrives (0<g<1). These apply
to all traded goods. As in DFS, transportation costs imply a range of goods is
nontraded, with this range described by z and z, the index of the upper and lowerGeographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 8
marginal goods respectively. Speciﬁcally, the marginal goods are deﬁned as DFS































Equations (6) and (7) deﬁne the supply wage schedules in both regions (see Figure
1).4
On the demand side, the utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, so the
expenditure share on each good, b(z), is constant and uniform over varieties, z,
with b(z)dz = b =1 . Hence b(z) is equal to unity for z ∈[0,1]. The balance of
payments condition requires Region 1 and Region 2 spending on imports to be
equal. This requires:
(1 − z)wL = zw
∗L
∗ (8)
4As is shown in Figure 1, the shape of the supply wage schedule needs to be convex. This
comes from the assumption of the mirror image technological structure on z=0.5 between the
regions. Ikema (1978) and Trionfetti (2004) employed a linear schedule, but it is a globally
asymmetric technological structure: each region has a non-zero and ﬁnite unit labor requirement
at z=0, whereas one region must have a zero unit labor requirement at z=1, in spite of a constant
ﬁnite value in the other, or the other region must have an inﬁnite unit labor requirement at
z=1, in spite of a constant ﬁnite value in its counterpart.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 9









As usual in DFS, but in contrast to the Krugman model, the larger region has the
relatively lower wage. This feature is the source of an important diversiﬁcation
f o r c et h a ti sa b s e n tf r o mn e we c o n o m i cg e o g r a p h ym o d e l s . 5 Equation (9) deﬁnes
t h ed e m a n dw a g es c h e d u l e( S e eF i g u r e1 ) .
Equations (6), (7), and (9) are solved for z and z and w
w∗ to determine the
equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that by symmetric structure w
w∗ =1 .
Consequently, the range from z to z is nontraded goods, and 0 to z is Region 1’s
exports, and from z to 1 is Region 2’s exports.6
2.2 The Stable Equilibrium
Next the local stability of the initial symmetric equilibrium is examined, following
standard practice in the new economic geography model.7 People can move freely
5In the monopolistic competition model, the more populated region has more than pro-
portionally higher wages (the home market eﬀect). See Krugman (1980) and Helpman and
Krugman (1985).
6Note that the nontraded goods come from the equilibrium feature, not the assumption.
On the other hand, Matsuyama and Takahashi (1998) assumed nontradable good industries a
priori.
7Baldwin (2001) classiﬁed dynamic analysis as three ways of migration processes: 1) informal
local stability analysis in myopia, 2) formal local stability analysis using the ordinary diﬀerential
equation method, and 3) global stability analysis by Liaponov’s direct method in forward-
looking expectation. This paper employs the ﬁrst method, as most economic geography models,
because it is the most simple and consequently equivalent to the global stability analysis in the
solution.This comes from Proposition 4 in Baldwin (2001): “The informal stability test of theGeographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 10
between regions, in search of the higher utility (as indicated by the real wage).
Utility is equalized at the initial symmetric equilibrium, but stability depends
on how marginal migration aﬀects the relative indirect utility ratio between the
two regions: namely V
V ∗. If marginal migration from Region 1 to 2 goes above
one, the marginal migrants would move back to Region 1. This indicates a stable
initial equilibrium (symmetric diversiﬁcation). If the migration pushes V
V ∗ below
one, more will move to Region 2. Thus symmetrical diversiﬁcation is not stable.
Hence, the local stability condition can be represented as:
d(lnV − lnV ∗)
dL∗ |sym > 0 (10)
To study this condition, we take logs of V










dz − (z − 1+z)lng (11)
The diﬀerence of the utility comes from three gaps: nominal wages, the prices of
nontraded goods, and the payment of transport costs for imports. A positive value
of (11) spurs the migration from Region 2 to 1, while a negative value creates
m i g r a t i o nf r o mR e g i o n1t o2 . D i ﬀerentiating (11) by the marginal migration
from Region 1 to 2 yields9
























standard CP model with myopia is mathematically equivalent to formal, local stability analysis
of CP model with forward-looking expectations. In particular, the break and sustain points
in the model with forward-looking migrants are identical to those in the model with myopic
migrants.”
8See Appendix 1.
9See Appendix 2.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 11
The ﬁr s tt e r m ,w h a tc a nb ec a l l e dt h e“ d i r e c tw a g ee ﬀect”, is always positive:
f r o m( 9 ) ,t h ei n c r e a s ei np o p u l a t i o ni nR e g i o n2a n dt h ed e c r e a s ei nR e g i o n1
boosts the relative wage, under ﬁxing the marginal goods — that is, the migration
raises the relative wage in Region 1. The second term, “indirect wage eﬀect”,
is always negative.10 The shifts of marginal goods are aﬀected by external IRS
(downward rotation of the supply schedule) and migration (shift-up of the de-
mand schedule) (see Figure 2). In the case of no external IRS (CRS), the indirect
eﬀect comes only from migration, and the direct wage eﬀects always exceed the
indirect eﬀects, which removes the incentive to migrate.11 On the other hand,
if external IRS were assumed to be so large that the indirect wage eﬀect could
exceed the direct wage eﬀect, the increase of L∗ could reduce the relative wage
w
w∗, and it would always drive migration. Obviously, the symmetric outcome
would always be unstable for any transportation costs under large IRS. There-
fore, the most interesting case to focus on in this paper is when external IRS
is small, i.e., no black hole condition (3) holds. The increase of population in
Region 2 decreases z and z, which mitigates the increase of w
w∗ from (9).12 Since
the indirect wage eﬀect cannot exceed the direct one, the magnitude of the third
negative term determines whether it is stable or not. The third term, “local
communication eﬀect in nontraded goods,” is negative from (2). The increase of
10See Appendix 4.
11Since the direct eﬀect always exceeds the indirect one and the communication eﬀect disap-
pears under CRS, the total value of (11) becomes positive: symmetric equilibrium is stable at
all times, independent of transportation costs. See Appendix 5.
12See Appendix 4 on the decrease of marginal goods.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 12
the population in Region 2 leads to the decreases in unit labor requirements in
nontraded sectors.
To build intuition, it is useful to consider the model without external IRS.
In this case, the migration to Region 2 has only two eﬀects. One is the negative
eﬀect on the relative wage in Region 2 through the change in population (direct
wage eﬀect). The other is the increase of production variety in Region 2, which
has a positive eﬀect on the wage in Region 2 (indirect wage eﬀect). Reintroduc-
ing external IRS yields two further eﬀects: one is the decrease of the unit labor
requirement in nontraded goods sectors in Region 2, which oﬀers relatively lower
prices in nontraded goods exclusively in Region 2 (communication eﬀect). The
other strengthens the indirect wage eﬀect: the increase in the variety of produc-
tion goods, which diminishes the decrease in nominal wage in Region 2, although
the indirect eﬀect is weaker than the direct eﬀect. These eﬀects are expressed as
the downward rotation of the supply wage schedules (from the solid line curves
to the dashed line curves), as in Figure 2. In sum, the direct wage eﬀect acts as a
diversiﬁcation force, while the indirect wage eﬀect and the local communication
eﬀect in nontraded goods act as agglomeration forces.
2.3 Global Stability and Simulation Results
In this section, we solve for equilibrium and examine its global stability, sup-
ported by Baldwin (2001). We start with symmetric equilibrium, L=0.5, moreGeographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 13
individuals migrate from one region to the other, and check what the impact is










dz − (z − 1+z)lng (13)
Figure 3 plots the resulting utility gaps for all possible distributions of L.13 For
low transportation costs (g=0.8), the diversiﬁed equilibrium is globally stable and
the agglomerated equilibrium unstable since the ln V
V ∗ curve is positively sloped
everywhere (Figure 3a). Conversely, for high transportation costs (g=0.4), con-
centration is globally stable and diversiﬁcation is globally unstable (Figure 3c).
These are parallel to the local stability discussion. However, for intermediate
transportation costs (g=0.5) there are multiple stable equilibria: both the con-
centration and diversiﬁcation equilibria are unstable, while the asymmetrically
diversiﬁed equilibria are stable, since ln V
V ∗ is negatively sloped at L=0.5, L=0,
and L=1 (Figure 3b). Figure 4 summarizes all the outcomes by showing the
relationship between transportation costs and population ratio. The solid line
represents the stable equilibrium, while the dotted line indicates the unstable
equilibrium. The diversiﬁcation is sustained at lower transportation costs, but
when transportation costs exceed a critical value the symmetric equilibrium can-
not be sustained — the asymmetric equilibrium appears. The increase of trans-
portation costs makes the two regions much more asymmetric, which results in
13See Appendix 7 on the production functions for the simulation.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 14
the concentration becoming stable for high transportation costs.14
For extremely low transportation costs, only a few nontraded goods and al-
most all tradable goods have emerged. Since the local communication eﬀect in
nontraded goods is almost negligible, the direct wage eﬀect deﬁnitely overcomes
the local communication eﬀect and the indirect wage eﬀect. The symmetric di-
versiﬁcation can be sustained. However, with increased transportation costs, the
communication eﬀect in nontraded goods grows through the increase in the range
of nontraded goods. The increase of the population in Region 2 leads to relatively
lower prices in its supply. However, only Region 2 can enjoy the lower price of
nontraded goods in favor of external IRS, which becomes an unstable symmetric
diversiﬁcation and leads to concentration due to high transportation costs.
For intermediate transportation costs, as migration proceeds, the size of the
communication eﬀect drastically diminishes. When the diversiﬁcation force ex-
ceeds agglomeration forces, migration stops and asymmetric equilibrium emerges.
The crucial factor slowing down migration is the reduction in the variety of non-
traded goods due to external IRS and transportation costs in the process of
migration.15 Figure 5 represents the reduction in nontraded goods (z−z)i nt h e
numerical simulations of Figure 2 and can conﬁrm the results: migration reduces
the variety of nontraded goods, and the reduction is greater for higher trans-
portation costs. Therefore, the reduction due to external IRS and transportation
14I tried to simulate the CRS case. Diversiﬁcation has occurred at all levels of transportation
costs.
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costs deﬁnitely reduces the communication eﬀect in nontraded goods acting as
an agglomeration force, slowing down the migration process with asymmetric
equilibrium emerging.
3W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
3.1 Welfare in Each Equilibrium
Bhagwati (1958) proposed that immiserizing growth may occur when the factor
endowment biasedly increases.16 In this paper, immigration worsens the terms of
trade, which is caused by the decrease of the relative nominal wage, as well as by
the decrease in the unit labor requirement through external IRS. On the other
hand, welfare is relatively enhanced by the decrease in the prices of nontraded
goods’ prices. This trade-oﬀ in welfare is examined by means of Pareto eﬃciency.
If the stable equilibrium Pareto dominates over the unstable equilibria, it pro-
duces an eﬃcient outcome. On the other hand, if the stable outcome is Pareto
dominated by another unstable one, it is ineﬃcient.
To start, we show Region 1 utility for symmetric and concentrated equilib-
ria. Each region faces the same level of the utility in asymmetric or symmetric
equilibrium. In a diversiﬁed equilibrium, the utility in Region 1 is given by:17
16In the 2x2 Ricardian Model with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, a population increase
always decreases relative wages and terms of trade (Immiserizing Growth), and the decrease of
the unit labor requirement owing to technological improvement also deteriorates terms of trade
(Millian Paradox).
17See Appendix 3 for the induction.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 16
lnV
1
div =( 1 − z)ln
w














The values of L, z, and z in equilibrium are used.18 The ﬁrst term is related
to the relative nominal wage, but this term becomes zero in the symmetrically
diversiﬁed equilibrium under the assumption of symmetrical regions. The second
term indicates the payment of transportation costs imposed on imports (from
z to 1). The higher transportation costs strengthen the negative eﬀect on the
utility by the consumption of higher priced import goods. The third term reﬂects
technology embodied in each good.







and can largely beneﬁt from external IRS, although they cannot help devastating
the location-speciﬁc technology of the other region.19
3.2 Welfare and Stable Equilibrium
Now we can discuss whether or not globally stable equilibria are eﬃcient by
comparing the indirect utility per capita in the stable outcome with unstable ones.
18For instance, L=0.5 is used in symmetric equilibrium.
19See Appendix 3 for the induction.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 17
If the indirect utility in the stable equilibrium cannot exceed that of unstable ones,
this stable equilibrium is dominated by the unstable one and so is ineﬃcient, and
vice versa. To facilitate the reasoning, Figure 6 plots how welfare in Region 1
varies with transportation costs, using (14) and (15). The values are the same as
in Region 2: V 1
div = V 2
div from free migration and V 1
con = V 2
con from two symmetrical
regions. Three ranges of transportation costs must be distinguished: range C (see
Figure 6) where full concentration is stable and symmetry is unstable, range B
where the asymmetric interior equilibrium is stable, and range A where only
symmetry is stable. V 1
conis constant and unaﬀected by transport costs as there
is no interregional trade. By contrast, V 1
div is higher as transport costs diminish
because of less welfare loss from payments of transport costs for imports.
As seen in Figure 6, range A has higher welfare in the symmetrically diversiﬁed
equilibrium, which is globally stable (see Figure 3a), compared with the concen-
trated equilibrium, which is unstable (see Figure 3a). Thus, for lower transporta-
tion costs, the symmetric equilibrium has the highest welfare and dominates the
concentrated equilibrium, which is consistent with the stable equilibrium. In par-
ticular, the case of very low transportation costs brings about almost all traded
goods. Thus, the communication eﬀect in nontraded goods is almost nothing,
and people can enjoy gains from specialized production and trade. Furthermore,
w e l f a r el o s si nd i v e r s i ﬁcation is small due to low transportation costs. These fac-
tors result in higher welfare in diversiﬁcation. On the other hand, terms of trade
would worsen welfare if concentration occurred: in the process of migration andGeographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 18
full concentration, the population increase brings about the aggravation in terms
of trade through immiserizing growth, and technological improvement through
increased population simply deteriorates the terms of trade, which is similar to
the 2x2 Ricardian Model with the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Then, range C in Figure 6 shows that full concentration has higher welfare
than diversiﬁcation. As seen in Figure 3c, full concentration is stable whereas
diversiﬁcation is unstable. This implies that concentration is dominant in the
presence of higher transportation costs, which corresponds to the stable equilib-
rium. The case of very high transportation costs brings about almost all non-
traded goods. Thus, the local communication eﬀect in nontraded goods is far
superior to the wage eﬀects. Terms of trade do not aﬀect welfare greatly, and
the local communication eﬀect gives only the beneﬁt of increasing outputs and
reducing prices, which can lead to greater wealth through concentration.
However, surprisingly, the case of intermediate transportation costs is prob-
lematic: range B shows that diversiﬁcation provides the best welfare and con-
centration gives the second best welfare, but Figure 3b demonstrates that both
are unstable. The stable equilibrium is asymmetric diversiﬁcation, and is domi-
nated by the other equilibria, in spite of having the worst welfare. This is related
to welfare loss from the payment of transportation costs. At full concentration,
there is no welfare loss from transportation costs: they are not paid. In asymmet-
ric diversiﬁcation, as shown in Figure 5, the range of nontraded goods is much
smaller than in symmetric equilibrium (L=0.5) for a given transport cost. In-Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 19
stead, the range of traded goods becomes larger, which leads to more payments
for transport costs and to greater loss of welfare than in symmetric equilibrium.
This interesting result shows the evidence that people myopically decide on mi-
gration without considering external IRS, which allows government intervention
to achieve Pareto optimal equilibrium.
4 Policies against Asymmetric Equilibrium
Government intervention is rational to prevent the above ineﬃcient outcome.
Ottaviano et al. (2002) suggested the possibility of ineﬃcient agglomeration.
Trionfetti (2001) proposed government procurement to defuse ineﬃcient agglom-
eration. In this paper, the best policy is to reduce transportation costs suﬃciently,
so as to reach stable symmetric equilibrium and enjoy the highest welfare. How-
ever, the implementation of this policy might be diﬃcult for some reasons, such
as topographical issues. Also we may face the imbalance of infrastructure al-
location between interregional and intraregional transport systems (Martin and
Rogers, 1995). Considering these aspects, the second best policy is available: the
production subsidy policy can be used in the initial symmetric equilibrium in
order to block the migration and sustain the symmetric diversiﬁcation.
The main cause of the ineﬃciency is the reduction in nontraded goods, and
thus an optimal policy is to exclude nontraded goods through the production
subsidy policy. However, the policy is crucial in the way of allocating amongGeographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 20
industries between regions.20 The subsidy is distributed to industries in reverse
proportion to comparative advantage, as in Figure 7. The greater comparative
advantage the industries have, the lower the subsidy granted. The two regions
provide this subsidy symmetrically, so that the range of nontraded goods disap-
pears and the only marginal good becomes z=z=0.5.21 The shape of the supply
schedule, considering the subsidy, changes completely: two horizontal lines and
a vertical line at the single marginal good (z=z=0.5). This is parallel to the
two-good two-country Ricardian Model. The vertical part of the supply schedule
wipes out nontraded goods, which leads to no agglomeration forces (indirect wage
eﬀect and communication eﬀect in nontraded goods), and strengthens the diver-
siﬁcation force (direct wage eﬀect). This allocation of subsidy always maintains
a diversiﬁcation outcome. Thus, the solution to prevent the above ineﬃcient case
is to subsidize the comparatively less advantageous industries so as to remove the
nontraded goods industries.
This kind of subsidy is completely diﬀerent from the one proposed in Itoh
and Kiyono (1987).22 The export subsidy in their study drives the country to
gain the production of the marginal good industry and to increase the range of
20The subsidy is assumed to be the same allocation to ﬁrms in the same industry, whereas
lump sum tax is levied equally on people in both regions by the central government.
21The two regions are assumed to be symmetrical, and subsidy rates are assumed to be
symmetrical on the center of z=0.5. Thus the total subsidy in each region is equal, which
allows equal tax rates. Further, the relative disposable income (utility ratio in the two regions)
does not also change after carrying out this subsidy policy because of the same tax rates per
capita.
22Itoh and Kiyono analyzed the role of export subsidy in the two-country DFS model, al-
though not related to economic geography literature (no migration and transport costs).Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 21
the production, which results in enhancing welfare at the sacriﬁce or detriment
of the welfare of the other region. However, the production subsidy in this paper
eliminates the agglomeration force and strengthens the diversiﬁcation force, and
thus it plays a role in creating the stability of the higher-welfare diversiﬁcation
and preventing a move to worse-welfare equilibrium at intermediate transport
costs.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyzes geographical concentration and diversiﬁcation in the DFS
framework. Higher transportation costs promote concentration, whereas lower
transportation costs drive diversiﬁcation. Concentration has the advantage of
making the best use of external IRS, but results in devastating the other region
including location-speciﬁc technology. On the other hand, symmetric diversiﬁca-
tion has the advantage of making the best use of both regions’ location-speciﬁc
technologies, but results in transportation costs being imposed on import goods
and no external IRS. More interesting is the case of intermediate transportation
costs: asymmetrical diversiﬁcation is globally stable, while symmetric concentra-
tion and diversiﬁcation are unstable. This is because external IRS and trans-
portation costs reduce the variety of nontraded goods and reduce the agglom-
eration force as migration proceeds. However, this equilibrium causes the worst
welfare due to increased transportation costs. For this reason, government inter-Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 22
vention can be required. A production subsidy, weighted to the comparatively
less advantageous sectors and nontraded goods sectors, can sustain symmetric
diversiﬁcation and prevent asymmetric diversiﬁcation.
With regards to recent international circumstances, the acceleration to eco-
nomic integration will result in a balanced development in each area, rather than
a core-periphery structure, on the basis of the movement toward freer trade and
the reduction of transportation costs and tariﬀ rates. Krugman’s epigram on the
future core-periphery world might be unnecessarily pessimistic. The geographi-
cal concentration through free trade and labor migration in the future may bring
relative prosperity without a disparity in wealth.
A possible extension of the model is when regions are not symmetric. When
migration is possible, workers move from the poorer to the richer region, making it
more likely that concentration occurs. Thus, it is important to verify by adopting
the DFS model (with asymmetric regions) a core-periphery outcome appears.
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Appendix 2 Induction of Equation The diﬀerentiation of the diﬀerence
of the utility function is induced, using Leibnitz’s rule:







































































































Appendix 3 Welfare Analysis The utility per capita in a diversiﬁed equi-
librium in Region 1 is induced in the following way:
lnV
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Appendix 4 The shift of the boundary of traded goods We show a
negative relation between l = L∗
L and z (z) at the initial equilibrium. We totally
diﬀerentiate (5):
gAz(z,l)dz − Az(z,l)dz + g
2Al(z,l)dl − Al(z,l)dl =0
where Az(z,l) ≡
∂A(z,l)
∂z ,A z(z,l) ≡
∂A(z,l)
∂z ,A l(z,l) ≡
∂A(z,l)
∂l ,A l(z,l) ≡
∂A(z,l)
∂l .
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Because of Az(z,l) < 0,A z(z,l) < 0,
Az(z,l)
Az(z,l) > 0, Al(z,l) < 0, and gAl(z,l) −
Al(z,l)
g > 0, the nominator is always negative. The denominator is always positive,
because l>1,
z
1−z < 1 and 0 <g 2 Az(z,l)
Az(z,l) < 1 hold in the marginal increase of l,
and thus Ω is negative. From Ω < 0,
dz
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The ﬁr s tt e r mi sn e g a t i v e( g2 Az(z,l)
Az(z,l) < 1 and Ω < 0). From gAl(z,l) −
Al(z,l)
g < 0,
the second term is negative. Hence, dz
dl < 0 holds. By these relations, plus
∂ ln w
w∗
∂z > 0 and
∂ ln w
w∗
∂z > 0 from (9), the indirect eﬀect is always negative.
Appendix 5 Wage Eﬀects under CRS T h ef a c tt h a tt h ed i r e c tw a g e
eﬀect always exceeds the indirect eﬀect under no external IRS in absolute value



















where ω = w
w∗. The second and third term denote the indirect wage eﬀect. Then,











Inserting the above equation into the second and third terms (indirect eﬀect) in











































 is always less than
one. Hence, the direct eﬀect
z
1−z is always larger than the indirect eﬀect under
CRS in absolute values.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 26




dl < 0 (that is,
dz
dl − dz


































where Ψ ≡ 1−
g2Az(z,l)
Az(z,l) , Φ ≡
g2Al(z,l)−Al(z,l)




























High transport costs more easily satisfy this condition. The increased trans-
port costs decrease z and increase z, other things being equal. Then, Az(z,l)
increases and Az(z,l) decreases more in negative magnitude, while the external
IRS is assumed to be kept small as in the no black hole condition: (3).
Appendix 7 Simulation The speciﬁc functions for simulation used in this










L∗Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 27
References
Baldwin, R (2001) ‘Core-periphery model with forward-looking expecta-
tions’, Regional Science and Urban economics 31: pp21-49.
Baldwin, R, P. Martin, and G.P. Ottaviano (2001) ‘Global Income Diver-
gence, Trade and Industrialization: The Geography of Growth Takes-Oﬀs’,
Journal of Economic Growth 6: pp5-37.
Baldwin, R, R. Forslid, P. Martin, G.P. Ottaviano and R.Nicoud (2003),
Economic Geography and Public Policy, Princeton University Press.
Bhagwati, J (1958) ‘Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note’ Review of
Economic Studies, 25: pp201-205.
Branstetter, L (2001) ‘Are Knowledge Spillovers International or Intra-
national in Scope? Micro-economic Evidence from the US and Japan’,
Journal of International Economics, 53(1), pp53-79.
Davis, D.R, D.E.Weinstein (2003), ‘Market access, economic geography and
comparative advantage: an empirical test’ Journal of International Eco-
nomics 59: pp1-23.
Dornbusch, R., S.Fischer, and P.Samuelson (1977) ‘Comparative Advan-
tage, Trade, and Payments in Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods’
American Economic Review,6 7 ( 5 ) .
Eaton, J and S.Kortum (1999) ‘Technology, Geography, and Trade’, mimeo.
Ellison, G and E.Glaeser (1999)‘The Geographical Concentration of In-
dustry: Does Natural Advantage Explain Agglomeration?’, American Eco-
nomic Review,8 9( 2 ) ,p p 3 1 1 - 3 1 6 .
Fujita, M., P. Krugman, and A. Venables (1999) The Spatial Economy,
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Forslid, R. and I. Wooton (2003) ‘Comparative Advantage and the Location
of Production’, Review of International Economics, 11(4): pp588-603.
Goodfriend, M and J. McDeremott (1995) ‘Early Development’, American
Economic Review 85: pp116-133.
Helpman and P. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade,
Cambridge, MIT Press.
Henderson, J.V. (1999) ‘Marshall’s Scale Economies’, NBER Working Pa-
per no 7358.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 28
Hoover, E.M. (1948) The Location of Economic Activity,N e w Y o r k ,
McGraw-Hill.
Ikema, M.(1978) ‘Note on the Ricardo-Millian trade model by Dornbusch,
Fischer, and Samuelson’ (Dornbusch- Fischer- Samuelson no Ricardo Mill
Boueki Moderu ni kansuru Oboegaki), (Japanese), mimeo, Hitotsubashi
University.
Itoh, M.,and K.Kiyono (1987) ‘Welfare-Enhancing Export Subsidies’, Jour-
n a lo fP o l i t i c a lE c o n o m y , 95(1): pp115-137.
Kremer, M (1993) ‘Population Growth and Technological Change: One
Million B.C. to 1990’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, pp681-716.
Krugman, P.R (1980) ‘Scale economics, product diﬀerentiation, and the
pattern of trade’, American Economic Review 70: pp950-959.
Krugman, P.R (1991a) Trade and Geography, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Krugman, P.R (1991b) ‘Increasing Returns and Economic Geography’, The
Journal of Political Economy, 99(3): pp483-499.
Krugman, P.R, and A.J.Venables (1995) ‘Globalization and the inequality
of nations’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(4): pp857-880
Marshall.A (1920) Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan.
Martin,P and C.A Rogers (1995) ‘Industrial location and public infrastruc-
ture’ Journal of International Economics 39: pp335-351.
Matsuyama, K and T. Takahashi (1998) ‘Self-Defeating Concentration’,
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol.65 (2): pp211-234.
Midelfart-Knarvik, K.H, H.G. Overman, S.J Redding and A.J. Venables
(2000) ‘The Rocation of European Industry’ Report prepared for European
Comission.
Midelfart-Knarvik, K.H, H.G. Overman, and A.J. Venables (2001) ‘Com-
parative advantage and economic geography: estimating the determinants
of industrial location in the EU’, LSE manuscript.
Midelfart-Knarvik, K.H, and H.G. Overman (2002) ‘Delocation and Eu-
ropean Integration: Is structural strategy justiﬁed?’, Economic Policy:
pp323-359.
Mills, E.S. (1967) ‘An aggregative model of resource allocation in a
metropolitan area’, American Economic Review 57: pp197-210.Geographical Concentration, Comparative Advantage, and Public Policy 29
Ottaviano, G, J.Thisse, and T.Tabuchi (2002) ‘Agglomeration and Trade
Revisited’ International Economic Review 43 (2), pp409-436.
Puga, D (1999) ‘The rise and fall of regional inequalities’, European Eco-
nomic Review 43: pp303-334.
Puga , D and A. J. Venables (1996) ‘The spread of industry; spatial ag-
glomeration and economic development’, Journal of the Japanese and In-
ternational Economics 10(4): pp440-464.
Ricci, L.A (1999) ‘Economic Geography and Comparative Advantage: Ag-
glomeration versus specialization’, European Economic Review 43, pp357-
377.
Samuelson, P.A (1954) ‘The Transfer problem and transportation costs:
Analysis of Eﬀects of Trade Impediments’, Economic Journal 64: pp264-
289.
Takahashi, T (2003) ‘International Trade and Ineﬃciency in the Location
of Production’, Journal of the Japanese and International economies 17.
Trionfetti, F (2001) ‘Public Procurement, Market Integration, and Income
Inequalities’ Review of International Economics 9 (1),pp29-41
Trionfetti, F (2004) ‘The home market eﬀect in a Ricardian model with a
continuum of goods’, in : Mucchielli J.-L. and T. Mayer (eds.), Multina-
tional Firms’ Location and New Economic Geography,C h e l t e n h a m:E d -
ward Elgar.
Venables,A. J. (1999) ‘The international division of industries; clustering
and comparative advantage in a multi- industry model’, Scandinavian Jour-
nal of Economics, 101: pp495-513.￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿








￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿z z











Supply Wage Schedule 
A(z)/g
(after migration)
-Demand wage Schedules (before and after migration)in Region 1 are omitted.
A(z)/g
  (before migration)
Demand Wage Schedule
migrationFigure 3a: Low Transportation Costs
Figure 3b: Intermediate Transportation Costs
Figure 3c: High Transportation Costs
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nNote:"Number of Nontraded Goods" is the difference of two marginal goods.
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Figure 6 Welfare in Each Equilibrium
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The dashed line represents the unstable equilibrium; 
the solid line represents the stable equilibrium.
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